systems over a finite field were proposed. They defined the bilinearity of the polar form of multivariate quadratic polynomial systems when they constructed a new secret key dividing technique. The secret key was first divided into two parts by using the bilinear property, and then one of them was divided into two subparts. In addition, the scheme was made interactive by requesting a constant finite element from the verifier in each round.
In [9] , the number of partitions was increased to 4 , while it is 3 in [12] . They first divided the secret key into two parts, and then each part was divided into two parts again. With this change, impersonation probability was improved.
In [11] , Sakumoto mentioned whether or not a public key identification scheme based on multivariate polynomials of degree more than two is efficient and presented new 3 -and 5 -pass identification schemes based on multivariate cubic polynomials. Sakumoto stated that the 3 -pass identification scheme was not productive but the 5 -pass identification scheme was highly efficient. In addition, the size of the public and private key in the proposed 5 -pass identification scheme was significantly reduced when compared with previous schemes.
In [3] , a multivariate quadratic ( M Q )-based signature scheme was proposed by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to the 3-pass identification scheme based on the M Q polynomials given in [12] . They also applied the Fiat-Shamir transform to the 5-pass identification scheme given in [12] . A modified version of this signature scheme was submitted to NIST's First Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project [4] .
Motivation
Cryptosystems based on multivariate polynomial systems are attractive for the post-quantum world since they are efficient and easy to construct. In [9, 11, 12] , zero-knowledge identification schemes based on multivariate quadratic or cubic polynomial systems were proposed. The comparison of identification schemes includes memory requirements, communication length, impersonation probability, and computation time for efficiency. Computation time is much more important than communication length since less computation time means fewer arithmetic operations [9] . Constructing efficient schemes is always important to improve the performance.
Identification schemes based on multivariate quadratic polynomials can be transformed into signature schemes.
In [3] , M Q -based signature schemes were obtained by applying Fiat-Shamir transform to 5-pass identification schemes based on M Q polynomials. The differences in these identification schemes mainly depend on the number of secret key partitions. It is natural to ask what will change when we use different secret key dividing techniques.
Our contribution
In this paper, we use different secret key partitions to construct a 3 -pass identification scheme by using bilinearity of the polar form. In other words, the secret key has 2 main parts. The former and latter parts have 2 and compare the proposed scheme to the previous schemes. In Section 5, we present an M Q-based signature scheme by transforming to the proposed 3-pass identification scheme based on M Q polynomials. In Section 6, the conclusion and future works are stated.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions. Let F q be a finite field with q elements where q is a prime power and F n q be an n -dimensional vector space of q elements.
Definition 1 [2] Multivariate polynomial systems consist of a large number of polynomials. A system of M Q
polynomials with n variables and m equations can be given as follows:
. . .
where the coefficients α Setup , Gen , P , and V .
• The Setup algorithm takes a security parameter 1 λ as an input and the output of this algorithm is a system parameter param .
• Gen is a key generation algorithm and uses param , which is the output of the Setup algorithm. Gen generates a (v, s) public and private key pair.
• P and V are the processes that are executed respectively by the prover and the verifier. P performs the operations by using public key v and secret key s on the prover side, while V uses public key v of the prover on the verifier side. Communication between the prover and the verifier begins with the commitment of the prover and continues with challenge and response. Since there is continuous communication between the prover and verifier, the pair of (P, V ) is an interactive identification scheme.
Multivariate quadratic polynomials are mostly preferred to construct identification schemes since one can easily obtain the polar form by using bilinearity. In Definition 4, the polar form of the function is given.
Definition 4 [12] Recall that if
where ∀ x 1 , x 2 ∈ A and y ∈ B . Let G be a bilinear function that is the polar form of F . It is defined as follows:
where x, y ∈ F n q .
The zero-knowledge identification scheme has challenge and response states between the prover and the verifier. In zero-knowledge identification schemes, the prover can convince the verifier without giving any useful information about the scheme and the secret key. The verifier challenges the prover and tries to reject the prover during the scheme. However, the prover replies to each of the verifier's challenges. Finally, although the verifier does not know any information about the scheme, he/she convinces the prover. At the end of the scheme, the verifier convinces and accepts the prover but he/she does not prove the knowledge that he/she is convinced by another. In this case, it is first thought that the verifier has unlimited computing power. Even if the verifier has unlimited computing power, the verifier cannot learn any useful information from communication about the scheme due to the statistical zero-knowledge property. An identification scheme must have completeness (Definition 5) and soundness (Definition 6) properties. [14] If an identification scheme is completed with the acceptance of the verifier, then completeness is achieved. [14] If a cheating prover cannot convince the verifier by impersonating someone else (except with negligible probability ε > 0), then soundness is achieved.
Definition 5 (Completeness)

Definition 6 (Soundness)
A commitment scheme, denoted as Com , allows the sender to make a commitment to the receiver and then the receiver verifies this commitment. Com has two phases. The first phase is the commitment phase. In this phase, the sender computes the commitment values to be sent to the receiver and sends to the receiver. The second one is the verification phase. The sender sends some parameters to the receiver so that the receiver can compute the commitment values. After getting the parameters, the receiver computes and verifies the commitment values. The commitment phase is used to ensure that the identification scheme can be a zeroknowledge identification scheme. For this reason, Com must satisfy statistically hiding and computationally binding properties. [8] Digital signatures provide authentication, nonrepudiation, and integrity. In digital signature schemes, a sender, who signs a message with his or her own private key, sends a message to a receiver. The receiver can verify the signed message by using the sender's public key. A digital signature scheme is a set of algorithms DSS = (KeyGen, Sign, V erif y) defined as follows [1] :
Definition 7 (Statistically hiding)
• KeyGen is a probabilistic key generation algorithm. KeyGen takes security parameter 1 k , where k ∈ N is the input and it outputs a public and secret key pair (p k , s k ) .
• Sign is a probabilistic signature algorithm that takes a secret key s k and a message m as input and then outputs a signature σ .
• V erif y is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes a public key p k , a message m, and a signature σ and generates a decision bit 1 or 0 that means the signature is accepted or rejected, respectively.
Correctness of the signature is mentioned if a signature scheme satisfies that for all
In Section 3, we construct a 3 -pass identification scheme satisfying completeness and soundness properties. Moreover, we check statistically hiding and computationally binding properties of the proposed scheme.
A new 3-pass identification scheme
In this section, we propose a new 3-pass identification scheme. We divide the secret key in a different way and use the polar form. To the best of our knowledge, this partition idea has not been used before. Our idea depends on modifying the idea given in [9, 12] . Let F be a multivariate quadratic polynomial system as in Eq.
(1). In [12] , the secret key is divided into two parts as s = r 0 + r 1 . Then r 0 is divided into two subparts as r 0 = t 0 + t 1 and F (r 0 ) = e 0 + e 1 . Our contribution is to divide r 1 into three parts by using bilinearity, i.e.
The secret key partitioning is demonstrated in Figure 1 . In Figure 2 , the proposed identification scheme is given. The prover executes some algorithms before an interactive scheme begins between the prover and the verifier in [12] . By Definition 3, the identification scheme begins with the Setup algorithm that generates an output as system parameter F ∈ R M Q(n, m, F q ), where ∈ R stands for a randomly chosen element. Gen receives randomly generated multivariate quadratic polynomials system F and the private key s . Then Gen computes the v = F (s) public key. Immediately after that, interactive communication starts. The prover randomly selects r 0 , r 1 
q for partitioning secret key s and obtains the other parts given in Figure 1 . After the secret key is partitioned, the prover prepares commitment values and sends the verifier hc, the hash value of the commitment values. Then the verifier challenges the prover. The prover helps the verifier to compute the commitment values by sending a response. If the verifier gets the same hc value, he accepts the prover's claim; otherwise, he rejects it. The verifier accepts the prover's claim as long as Eqs. (2) and (3) hold. 
The correctness of the scheme is proved by using Definition 4. Our aim is to show v = F (s) .
Statistically hiding and computationally binding properties
Now we show that the proposed scheme satisfies the statistically hiding and computationally binding properties.
Theorem 1 (Zero-knowledge) The 3-pass identification scheme is statistically zero-knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Proof Let S be a simulator that will impersonate an honest prover against the cheating verifier without knowing what the secret key is. S selects a Ch ′ ∈ R {0, 1} that the cheating verifier will not choose where
and sends the verifier. The verifier sends a new Ch ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} .
S can impersonate the honest prover with probability 1/2.
When Ch ′ = 1 and Ch = 0 , it is obtained that e
In the other case, when Ch ′ = 1 and Ch = 1 , the verification is much easier since public key v is not used. For the other case ( Ch ′ = 0 and Ch ∈ {2, 3}), the idea is similar.
Consequently, someone using S can create a copy of the scheme. However, when the commitment scheme
Com is statistically hiding, one cannot get any useful information although a copy of the scheme is received. Note that only scheme transcripts are obtained. 2
Theorem 2 (Soundness) The 3-pass identification scheme is an argument of knowledge with error probability
1/2 in each round when the commitment scheme Com is computational binding.
Proof Let
be four transcriptions of the proposed identification scheme such that Ch i = i and the decision function 
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1 . Then, by Definition 4, we can conclude that v = G(r (3) 0 , r After the last set s 3 is used, then the equations are as follows:
Since Com has the binding property, we can write the following equations:
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2 . Then, by using Definition 4, we can conclude that v = G(r (3) 0 , d The proof indicates that anyone must be able to respond to at least 3 out of 4 challenges to reach the secret key or solve the multivariate quadratic system. 2
Remark 1 Impersonation probability is closely related to Theorem 2. The error probability in Theorem 2
indicates the possibility that an attacker cannot impersonate. The error probability is the complement of the impersonation probability.
Observations
Recall that the computation time is computed by the number of F and G functions used in Com [9] . Note that less computation time is better in view of efficient schemes. We note that the computation time remains the same when the secret key is first divided into two parts regardless of the number of subparts during the experiments. In other words, if the polar form given in Definition 4 is used and the secret key is divided into two parts, the computation time is 5/2 due to the bilinear polar form. However, when the number of subparts of the secret key increases, the total memory also increases. 
Remark 2 The first question that comes to mind is
Efficiency analysis and comparison
In this section, we analyze the proposed scheme and compare it with other identification schemes based on multivariate quadratic polynomials in terms of memory requirements, communication length, impersonation probability, computation time, and the efficiency metric. The results are summarized in Table 1 . [9] .
We provide some notations for memory requirements:
• Each subpart of the secret key is n -bit for s ∈ F n q .
• The output of the F polynomial system is m -bit.
• The hash values and the outputs of Com are 2m-bit.
Now we compute the memory requirement for the prover side. At the beginning of the identification scheme, the prover computes three subparts, each of which is n -bit, with the outputs of these two subparts by F that are 2m-bit. Then the prover computes seven commitment values, each of which is 2m -bit, and the hash value hc of the commitment values. Total memory is 18m + 3n bits. Now we compute the memory requirement for the verifier side. The verifier computes five commitment values in each round, 10m -bit. The communication length is computed as follows: it needs hc, and challenge and response values are 2m-bit. The verifier's challenge is 2-bit and Rsp , the prover's response, is 7m + 4n bits.
The total communication length is 9m + 4n + 2 bits. Total memory includes prover, verifier, and communication length. Thus, it is 37m + 7n + 2 bits. F and G functions are the most time-consuming parts of Com . In addition, lower numbers of them mean better timing results since the computation time is obtained by dividing the number of these F and G functions into challenges [9] .
Remark 3
The more partitions that the secret key is divided into, provided that the polar form and the properties of bilinear functions are preserved, the lower the probability is that the adversary will reach the secret key. By Table 1 , as the number of subparts of the secret key increases, the total memory also increases accordingly. When the total memory is computed for n = 84 , m = 80 bits, there is no significant difference between these systems in view of memory requirements.
A new MQ-based signature scheme
In this section, we convert the proposed 3 -pass identification scheme into a signature scheme. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter (for instance, k = 128 ), while n, m ∈ N are the same as in Definition 1. Let F and
1 indicate the M Q system and size of the M Q system F as in Definition 1, respectively.
We need the following functions:
• Cryptographic hash functions:
Key generation (KeyGen): We first generate a key pair ( p k , s k ) and the M Q system F . We randomly select a k -bit seed that is SK ← R {0, 1} k for the secret key and S F ← R {0, 1} k for F . By using pseudorandom generator G S F and G S K with the related seeds S F and S K , we construct M Q system F = G S F (S F ) and
, respectively. Then we compute P K v = F (SK F2 ) to obtain part of the public key. The key generation algorithm ends with a pair of keys (p k , s k ), where p k = (S F , P K v ) and s k = (S F , SK).
Signature generation (Sign):
The digital signature scheme runs the Sign algorithm after the key generation algorithm. The Sign algorithm inputs the message m ∈ {0, 1} * and the secret key s k = (S F , SK) .
We generate F = G S F (S F ) as it is the same in KeyGen . We compute a message value M = H(SK||m) ,
where || denotes a string concatenation. Then we again compute a message digest value D = H(M ||m) . The signature has to include M to verify the same message digest in verification.
By Section 4, the prover selects the secret key parts in the beginning of the scheme. As the identification scheme, we expand (SK, D) to generate the secret key parts by using pseudorandom generator G C for producing the values: (r (0,0) , . . . ,
u (1, 0) , . . . , u (1,r) ) , where r indicates the number of required rounds. Then we compute the following values for each round i as in Section 4:
After getting all values, we compute commitment values using the string commitment function Com . The commitment values are as follows:
We compute σ0 = H(c (0,0) ||c (1, 0) ||c (2, 0) ||c (3, 0) ||c (4, 0) ||c (5, 0) ||c (6, ||c (5,r−1) ||c (6,r−1) ) . Then we obtain the challenge from Ch i = H 1 (D, σ 0 ). We concatenate all responses for each challenges ch i and get σ1 = ( r (1,i) ||t (1,i) ||e (1,i) (1,i) ||u (1,i) ||c (1,i) ||c (6,i) ) . Note that since some c (j,i) commitment values cannot be computed for each Ch i , we add them to σ 1 . In other words, for
respectively. The signature is σ = (M, σ 0 , σ 1 ) and the size of the signature is 2k + r · (4n + 3m + 2k) bits. (1, 0) ||c (2, 0) ||c (3, 0) ||c (4, 0) ||c (5, 0) ||c (6, 0) || . . . ||c (0,r−1) ||c (1,r−1) ||c (2,r−1) ||c (3,r−1) ||c (4,r−1) ||c (5,r−1) ||c (6,r−1) ). If σ ′ 0 = σ 0 , the signature is verified.
Signature verification (Verify
Security analysis of the proposed signature scheme
Now we give the security analysis for the proposed signature scheme. We prove this theorem by combining the methods in [3, 5] . Our strategy is to use a divide-and-conquer approach for the proof. First, we need to recall some definitions. Then, by using these, we complete the proof.
In Definition 10, the definition of Fiat-Shamir transform for the q2 -identification scheme given in [3] is modified for the proposed identification scheme. zero-knowledge and soundness properties given in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the proposed DSS is EU-CMA secure. 2
Comparison
In this section, we compare the proposed signature scheme with the previous ones in view of signature and key sizes. In Table 2 , the signature schemes constructed from identification schemes are compared in terms of key and signature sizes. Note that we construct the digital signature scheme (DSS) based on [9] to give a comparison. Since we focus on our identification scheme and its effects, we omit DSS based on [9] . In Table 2 , " 3 -pass" refers to the signature scheme that transforms from the 3 -pass identification scheme in [3] . Now we compute the signature and key sizes. Recall that the signature is σ = (M, σ 0 , σ 1 ) . In the signature, M and σ 0 , which are the outputs of the hash function, are k -bit. Then σ 1 , the concatenation of all responses for each round, is r(4n + 3m + 2k) bits. Total signature size is 2k + r(4n + 3m + 2k) . The proposed scheme has the same key size with 3 -pass signature scheme and is smaller than the 5 -pass signature scheme. The signature size of the proposed scheme is smaller than the 5-pass signature scheme. The proposed scheme has lower signature and key sizes when compared to the 5-pass given in [4] .
Conclusions and future works
We propose a novel 3 -pass zero-knowledge identification scheme based on multivariate quadratic polynomials.
We divide the secret key into partitions with a new partition technique by using the same polar form in [9, 12] .
We present a new identification scheme having the same computation time as in [9] . We also propose a new M Q -based signature scheme by applying Fiat-Shamir transform to the proposed 3-pass identification scheme. We reduce the signature and key sizes compared to the 5-pass signature scheme in [4] . As a future work, a new digital signature scheme based on the identification scheme given in [9] can be constructed. In addition, an identification scheme and related signature scheme can be proposed by d -linear polar form.
